In the second week of January, extending from the 9th to the 15th, foreign press analysis of Lebanon and the region continued to be dominated by Israel’s war in Gaza, with the focus moving toward discussion of essential elements required for a ceasefire. The main points can be summarized below:
- Israel, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority should work together on an effective strategy to end the flow of weapons into Gaza. Egypt would have to close the tunnels and stop the flow of weapons to Hamas so as to reverse the regional trend toward resistance being promoted by Tehran.
-- The following elements are required to end hostilities: stopping the smuggling of arms into Gaza, ending the rocket attacks, securing the border crossings for humanitarian aid and denying Hamas legitimacy and sovereignty.
- It falls on Israel, along with the US and other moderate states, to help Fatah prepare the West Bank for real freedom, so that the people of Gaza can see an alternative to their present situation.
On the elements needed to end Hostilities in Gaza, David Schenker writes in the Boston Globe that to stop the bloodshed, Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority should work together on an effective strategy to end the flow of weapons into Gaza. He sees Cairo as the “lone bridge” to a solution in Gaza. Schenker explains that although Egypt has been dealing with a “laissez faire” attitude toward the tunnels, it has kept the crossings closed, against Hamas’s wishes, since the start of the incursion. Schenker argues that as calls for a cease-fire heighten, there seems to be a “clear” convergence of interests between Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian Authority that they’d like to see Hamas “weakened.” To that end, the writer stresses, Egypt would have to close the tunnels and stop the flow of weapons to Hamas so as to not just stall but reverse “the regional trend toward resistance being promoted by Tehran.”
In an interview with the late Nizar Rayyan, Jeffrey Goldberg, writing in the New York Times, questions if Israel should consider engaging with Hamas. Goldberg writes that when he asked Rayyan if he would agree to anything more than a “tactical” ceasefire, the assassinated Hamas leader replies that “it will not take long for the forces of Islam to eradicate Israel.” Based on this quote, Goldberg notes that Israel might be capable of deterring Hamas militarily, but it cannot defeat its “deeply felt belief,” making the notion that Hamas can be “bombed” into moderation seem rather “false.” In this sense, “the small chance” for peace today has not changed since the onset of the current conflict. Goldberg adds that it is up to Israel, along with the US and other moderate states, to help Fatah “prepare the West Bank for real freedom.” The hope is that the people of Gaza would then see the West Bank as an “alternative to the squalid vision of Hassan Nasrallah and Nizar Rayyan.”
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman whether the Israeli war in Gaza is meant to eradicate or educate Hamas. He compares the casualties in the present conflict to those of the 2006 July war with Hezbollah, noting that in 2006 Israel meant to educate Hezbollah, and make them responsible, in the eyes of Lebanese, for the war’s destruction. Such goals for Hezbollah are probably all Israel can achieve with a “non state actor,” Friedman contends while asserting that more can be done with Hamas. Friedman argues that the Obama administration must present Hamas with a clear choice: are they “about destroying Israel or building Gaza?” Friedman adds that for diplomacy to kick in Israel would have to recognize “Hamas’ right to rule,” and Hamas would have to “to signal a willingness to assume responsibility for a lasting cease-fire and to abandon efforts to change the strategic equation with Israel.”
Robert Satloff addressed a Policy Forum luncheon at The Washington Institute, where he argued that “the Gaza Strip crisis will be the first issue addressed by the Obama-Clinton foreign policy team.” Satloff stressed that the elements needed to end hostilities are the following: curtail arms smuggling into Gaza, end rocket attacks from the Strip, secure the border crossings so that humanitarian aid can enter Gaza and deny Hamas legitimacy and sovereignty. Satloff told the Luncheon that if Egypt pursues a “wise course” in the crisis, it would be a “win-win for Cairo, Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Washington.” It is unlikely that the Obama-Clinton team will engage with Hamas, he said, given that the act would undermine “popular support” for the PA. Moreover, Satloff points out that it makes “little sense to waste capital and credibility on an early tilting at Hamas's windmills,” before the administration has committed to a new approach with Iran. It is important according then that the Gaza crisis not distracts Obama’s team from the “bigger test confronting them: the challenge of Iran.”
Dalia Dassa Kaye, an expert writing in Foreign Policy, notes that given the uncertainty of Israel’s intentions in Gaza, some observers see the offensive as targeting Iran. The writer argues, however, that “Iran's regional position has little to do with Hamas.” She explains that Hamas and Iran are “not as wedded” as some think, noting that Hamas is part of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood movement, and not a natural partner with Shiite Iran. The two also pursue different agendas and have diversified portfolios across the region. On that account she stresses that “a serious setback for Hamas is unlikely to undermine Iranian influence elsewhere in the region.” On the other hand, Kaye contends that “different US relations with Iran are more likely to affect dynamics in Gaza than Gaza changing the equation with Iran.” Iran would likely stop “obstructing” peace efforts in the region only when the country’s leaders see larger potential gains, and there is no reason to assume that destroying Hamas would lead to Iran’s defeat.