Laila is seventeen from Hermel, a Shia town in the Bekaa, where she lives with her single mother and four siblings in an impoverished household. Top of her class and ambitious, she refused to wear the veil, when, at 12, her mother thought it was time.

That was five years ago, before Laila’s mother got an offer from Hezbollah. The party would “adopt” the youngest boy, and in return the family would receive a monthly allowance, school tuitions and social services. But the family also had to commit religiously and politically to the party. So Laila wore the veil.

As such, Laila’s story is not uncommon in Hermel and other Shia towns in Lebanon, where Hezbollah “adopts” orphans or children of poor families and helps them financially.

Ever since the 2006 July War, when it was forced to redistribute its military infrastructure, Hezbollah's grip on the neglected remote North Lebanon region of Hermel has tightened. By dispensing services, cultivating the noble Resistance ideal and appearing to defer to the state when it suits it on matters such as cannabis farming and petty crime, it has found a willing and grateful Shia constituency fed up with the fact that the state has no real institutional presence there. Quite simply, in Hermel, Hezbollah has supplanted the state.

But in exchange for its largesse, Hezbollah demands commitment to the party. During elections it can call upon a large and loyal following (the poor are, after all, the majority). Laila, of course, had to pay a price. As well as being forced to wear the veil, she had to move to one of the party’s schools while her sister, Sabine, was “encouraged” to study religion, a training she will eventually pass on to future generations of young girls in the community.

Go for the glory

Despite the fact that it is building and expanding two military bases in the mountains of Hermel, Hezbollah’s strategy is to be seen providing services and money in the area – it has built schools, a hospital, medical centers, social service centers and a public library – while leaving the confrontation to the state. Meanwhile, the ISF, as it has done in Dahiyeh, has increased its presence in Hermel to clamp down on petty crime, although it has been unable to curb the cannabis trade.

According to Khodr, a Hezbollah member, the party asked the ISF to intervene in Hermel, “because they prefer to stay away from confronting the people.” It wants to have the support, not the hate, of the people, leaving any complaints to be directed at the state.

Khodr said he joined the party because he had no chance of finding a decent job. The only options were farming his unprofitable land or joining the army, which required influence or wasta he didn’t have. He joined Hezbollah because it was easier, and, in any case, the party provided a better “package.” 

Other options for local men include cutting wood, but only for those who have lands with trees, or growing cannabis, which is both illegal and unprofitable for the farmers, who by and large, get ripped off by the local drug baron.

Mahdi, on the other hand, joined the army, not because he preferred to be part of the state institution, but because Hezbollah refused his application. “I was not up to their standards. I had a few drinks in my life, had a girlfriend,” he said.

Proximity to Syria is another factor in the success of Hezbollah’s Hermel project. The nearest town is Homs in Syria, and as soon as you arrive in Hermel, you receive “welcome to Syria tel” text message.

There are a lot of inter-marriages between Lebanese from Hermel and Syrians, and people living in Hermel buy most of their goods from Syria because, simply, it is cheaper (most Baalbek-Hermel residents say that border demarcation and a tightening of regulations would harm them economically because it would reduce the ability to travel).

Providing an alternative

According to Mahdi, March 14 is trying to compete with Hezbollah in the area, providing services ahead of the elections, such as paving roads, or “giving” money and petrol to families. The problem is that it is very difficult to beat Hezbollah because such aid is random in the face of the party’s established institutions. “They do not just give away money to people, and that makes them more credible,” Mahdi added. Hussein, a former communist, concurs. “Hezbollah is present here, with its institutions, centers, officials and members. They are not going anywhere.”

The people of Hermel, even those who consider themselves communists or secular – members of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party or Free Patriotic Movement – speak of Hezbollah with respect and understanding, compassion and sympathy, not just as a source of money and services. 

To provide an alternative to the Hezbollah political machine the message is clear: The state must impose its will, while if the majority wants to be taken seriously it must invest in sustainable projects that would lead to long-term development. This at least would give the people of Hermel a viable alternative.