During the 2006 July war, Mona Fayyad, a Shia who chairs the Psychology Department at Lebanese University, wrote an essay for the leading Lebanese daily An-Nahar entitled “To be a Shia now.” The article stirred a public debate on the issue of Lebanese Shia who blindly follow Hezbollah.

To be a Shia now “is to block your mind” and let Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, “command you, drive you, decide for you what he wants from the weapons of Hezbollah, and force on you a victory that is no different from suicide,” Fayad wrote. “To be a Shia and dare to write and think such ideas means you are a collaborator and a traitor.”

Fayad's essay gave an outlet to some of the frustration that has built up among many Lebanese Shia. Although a largely symbolic gesture when measured against the widespread Shia support of Hezbollah, the essay offered an idea of a Shia mindset that is not present in the political scene in Lebanon. All this might be changing. For despite a tradition of being guaranteed electoral victories in the Shia areas, Hezbollah and Amal might find the 2009 elections tougher than they think, due to the possible emergence of credible non-Hezbollah/Amal Shia contenders.  

Taking in the Shia

The huge public demonstration of March 8, 2005 saw Lebanon’s Shia community, even those who supported Amal, drawn into Hezbollah’s orbit (a trend that would be exacerbated after the 2006 war) and its leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, became the de facto Za’im, or leader, of the community.  While Hezbollah has succeeded to some extent in convincing the Shia that theirs is a community predicated on resistance – in part because there is some truth to the party’s claim to having empowered the Shia while other Lebanese sects neglected them – they have also succeeded in isolating the community from the rest of the Lebanese society.

During the final days of Ramadan, 2008, an Iftar was held by the Gathering of Independent Lebanese Shia Associations in honor of Sayyed Ali al-Amin, who appeared publicly for the first time since he was forcefully removed from his position as mufti of the South and home in May.

In his speech, Amin noted that there are still independent Shia who continue to resist despite all the pressure and intimidation exerted on them. “The religious parties dominating the Shia community today are displaying a kind of pre-Islamic or Jahiliyyeh behavior. They have transformed this community into a tribe, wherein it is considered a sin to express any diversity of opinion and individuality is shunned,” he said.

Divine tyranny

Hezbollah is not only in total denial of these voices, they do not hesitate to suppress such opinions. According to its leadership, the Shia as a community should find power in its sectarian feelings. Shiism, in this sense, should be the nation for the Shia, instead of Lebanon.

The party’s dictatorial rhetoric and behavior indicates that they have been trying to transform the sect into the Party of God, and woe betide any one Shia who dares argue with Hezbollah’s “divine” decisions.  Sayyed al-Amin endured a number of attacks on his office and home, before he was removed from his position, while Hezbollah and Amal threw stones at US Ambassador Michelle Sison in Nabatiyeh on her way to visit Sayyed Abdallah Bitar, senior Shia cleric.

As “divergent” voices among the Shia are becoming louder, Hezbollah is becoming more tyrannical. This behavior may reflect a degree of fear as it realizes that it cannot implement its agenda with force alone. The region is at a critical point, and Hezbollah might be facing a crisis if the regional dynamics did not serve its interests. At the same time, Shia intellectuals and journalists are critical of the party’s behavior, especially since its attempted coup on May 7.

Hezbollah is aware that the majority of the Shia, whether supportive of Hezbollah or not, cannot endure another war, because they are the ones who pay the price and even take the blame, as has been the case since May, with many Shia facing isolation and alienation from fellow Lebanese. That’s why Hezbollah cannot afford to target Israel before the 2009 parliamentary elections. If they do, they’ll face an enormous Shia backlash.

Election vibes

There are a number of families and key figures within the Shia community that could constitute a threat to Hezbollah’s electoral plans. The influence and standing of the Assaad, Amin, Osseiran, Khalil, Shamseddine, Sharafeddine, Hamadeh, Husseini and other families (all of whom have reduced their support for Hezbollah after its Iranian agenda become obvious) is still present in the collective memories of the Shia. So far, these clans have not constituted a threat to Hezbollah electorally but with the enactment of the 1960 law, there is a chance that certain anti-Hezbollah Shia politicians, such as Ahmad al-Assaad, might create an upset.

In addition to the support he receives for the West and March 14 coalition, Assaad will run in the constituency of Marjayoun, which has, along with a good number of Shia who support Assaad, 23,006 Sunni and 14,080 Druze voters. There are 74,441 Shia voters but in the absence of an electoral “settlement” and if MPs Walid Jumblatt and Saad Hariri give Assaad the Druze and the Sunni votes, there is a good chance that he will sneak a parliamentary seat.

It could happen. In the 2004 municipality elections, in those areas where Hezbollah and Amal ran against each other, Hezbollah won around 40% of the votes in Shia villages and towns, while Amal and a few independent candidates won the rest of the votes. And in the last parliamentary elections, Hezbollah could only win 12 out of 27 Shia seats in the parliament, which has 128 MPs, even though it had allied with Christian, Sunni and Druze parties. Finally, although Amal appears powerless under Hezbollah’s authority, it still enjoys vast support within the Shia community and with regional dynamics at play (if Iran and Syria did not share the same agenda) Amal’s voice will be loud. 

Hezbollah has convinced many in the Shia community that protecting the resistance is essential to the preservation of Shia political strength, and that any attempt to disarm the resistance should thus be seen as an attempt at communal disempowerment. However, the Shia who feel safe under the Hezbollah umbrella, must be assured that when politicians, or any other public or private figures, criticize Hezbollah, it is not a step towards re-marginalizing the broader Shia community. For only once the Shia feel secure, and fully recognized as an integral part of the fabric of Lebanese society, that they will be able to stand up to the bullying and intimidation that Hezbollah has made its own.