It may be a case of Damascus caressing with one hand and slapping with the other. Wednesday’s callous bombing in Tripoli was in all probably a reminder to the Lebanese that whatever touchy-feely vibes there might have been ahead of President Michel Sleiman’s visit to Damascus – one wrapped in the promise of a breakthrough on diplomatic relations, the fate of Lebanese detainees and talks on border demarcation – Syria still controls this neighborhood and is seeking to smash any concerted opposition to its local and regional influence.

Any real concessions would stick in the Syrian throat, and already the signals are that nothing but a patina of pomp will define the visit. This should come as no surprise to anyone (except maybe French President Nicolas Sarkozy) who has been following the Baathist apparatus at work since April 2005. Simply put, Syria’s goal is the reassertion of its control over Lebanon, this time as part of a regional axis with Iran, and a well-armed Hezbollah and its allies doing its bidding.

At the time of writing there have been no claims of responsibility, but in the sectarian tinderbox that is Tripoli, people will have already made up their own minds. In such a volatile country, what better place to create chaos by creating an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust? What better time to divide the multitudinous Sunnis of the North’s major city? What better time to accuse the state of being weak by implying a lapse in security? What better time to raise the specter of the so-called Sunni threat by accusing the northern Salafists of the bombing? What better time even to consider intervention in the name of regional security?

The Russians are the current pace setters. They have reminded the Georgians in no uncertain terms that they are still the regional superpower, and even Tbilisi’s close ties with the West – Georgia is on the verge of NATO membership – cannot apparently save it from the Kremlin’s formidable war machine. Why then, should Lebanon, a minnow on the world stage, be spared similar intimidation by its own overbearing neighbor, Syria, on the eve of what is supposedly a new page in Lebanese-Syrian relations?

The bomb at one of Tripoli’s busiest bus stops, like the Ain Aalaq bombing in January 2007, was designed to strike without warning at rush hour. There can be no greater weapon with which to spread fear among an urban population, but what is more sinister is the possibility that, in hinting at the prospect of an Iraq-in-Lebanon scenario, the West might be tempted to turn to anyone, including Damascus, to nip it in the bud.

If that happened, it would be game, set and match to Mr. Assad.