During a Friday sermon in Tripoli’s predominantly Sunni neighborhood of Abu Samra earlier this month, a sheikh at the local Mohammad al-Amin Mosque angered residents when he insulted Saudi Arabia, Future Movement leader Saad Hariri and several pro-March 14 politicians, among them, Tripoli MP Misbah al-Ahdab. According to Abu Samra resident Abdullah Hassoun, the sheikh is a member of Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami (the Islamic Unification Movement), a Sunni Islamist group which falls under the Syrian-backed, Hezbollah-allied umbrella organization Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami (The Islamic Action Front).

Speaking to NOW Lebanon, Hassoun and others who live in Abu Samra claimed that clashes between Tawhid members and neighborhood residents (some of whom are members of the pro-March 14 Tripoli Brigade) have been persisting for weeks now, sometimes culminating in violence and casualties.
 
A “security zone” in Tripoli?

The question of Abu Samra made the news recently when MP Ahdab alleged that the army and the ISF are operating under the understanding that the neighborhood is “off limits.” Speaking to NOW Lebanon, Ahdab said that the security forces “answered to politicians’ demands [to investigate Abu Samra by stating that]… the Tawhid are covered on a security level by Hezbollah.”

According to Ahdab, Tripoli residents are aggravated that the Lebanese army cannot go into certain “zones” of the city. Ahdab has demanded that the government investigate “every building in Abu Samra and seize weapons,” if there are any, to help put an end to daily clashes before the situation escalates.

Sunni Islamist movements operating from Palestinian camps and other areas in North Lebanon, mainly in Abu Samra and al-Mina, have indeed been able to flourish with relative flexibility thanks to the prolonged political vacuum, the lack of security intervention and an unsecured Syrian-Lebanese border.

Allegedly, Tawhid is receiving a security “cover” in Tripoli from Hezbollah through high-ranking member Wafik Safa, and the movement’s partisans regularly parade around the city in bulletproof cars, flaunting their weapons and intimidating residents. According to Ahdab, Abu Samra has in turn been transformed into Tripoli’s own Hezbollah-controlled “security square,” with MP Fathi Yakan, head of the Front, acting as the Syrian spokesperson and the Sunni link for the opposition in the North.

The Front has also allegedly been recruiting young, unemployed Northern men for military training. According to Ahmad al-Ayoubi, head of the Freedom and Development Movement and a researcher on Islamist movements, recent data has emerged showing that 70-80 young Front members are, on a weekly basis, “going beyond Nabi Sheet in the Bekaa… and receiving military training with the instructions and guidance of Hezbollah” at several training camps. Ayoubi added that these activities raise the question of whether such training “is a form of resistance… or if it is a cover for security in light of the current political struggle,” particularly as Lebanon's front-line with Israel is, indeed, far from the North. 

The data, Ayoubi said, was revealed after a recent division within the Front, with some 160 members under Sayifeddine al-Husseineh choosing to go their own way following disagreements over the organization’s source of funding and relations with Syria and Hezbollah. The Front, however, has vehemently denied that these divisions exist.

Hezbollah takes the sectarianism out of Islamism

The Abu Samra incidents raise questions about the nature of the relationship between Tawhid and other militant Sunni movements, such as Hamas, and the predominantly Shia Hezbollah.

While American foreign policy makers have viewed the region, particularly as the Iraq war rages on, in terms of a Sunni-Shia struggle, a similar analysis of Lebanon’s state of affairs proves inaccurate. Despite the contradictory worldviews of the movements in question, there appears to be an overlap in their political agendas, particularly with regard to anti-Israel, anti-American sentiment. According to an article authored by Brookings Institute researcher Bilal Saab last year, “In Lebanon, no actor has challenged… the notion of a Sunni-Shi’ite schism more than Hizb’allah,” particularly as it successfully advertises itself as a broad-based Muslim resistance movement.

For example, and as stated by Saab, both during and after the Israeli invasion in 1982, Sunni militas collaborated with Hezbollah against right-wing Christian militias and Israeli forces in the South. More recently, in the wake of the 2006 July War, the crystallization of the “holy” alliance was a natural progression of local affairs: The Front publicly aligned itself with Hezbollah upon its inception in late 2006. Following the war, Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah collaborated with militant Sunni fighters during the conflict, most likely a reference to the Front. Hezbollah has, in addition, held high-level meetings with MP Yakan in an attempt to join forces on several levels.

Where to?

Given that Islamism in the North is not new, the present dilemma is how the government should deal with current tensions without fanning the flames of the alliance between Sunni Islamists and Hezbollah.

In a recent Middle East Times article,   Bilal Saab suggested that the government is taking the threat of Sunni Islamism seriously by employing a rigorous counter-terrorism strategy that addresses the region’s poverty and focuses on socio-economic development, in addition to fostering dialogue, particularly between Salafist and Islamist leaders and ISF Chief Ashraf Rifi.

In the long-term, these initiatives may well help alleviate underlying tensions, and any efforts at poverty alleviation in the desperately poor North are laudable indeed. However, it is uncertain whether this strategy will have an impact on the problem in the immediate future, particularly in light of already high tensions, the alleged large-scale presence of weapons in both the Abu Samra and al-Mina districts of Tripoli – and rumors that opposing factions may be armed, too.

In order to stop the situation from escalating further, the government must seriously investigate allegations that the Front is amassing weapons in Abu Samra and sending members for training under Hezbollah in the Bekaa, which, according to Ayoubi, is for the Front and other opposition factions, including the FPM, Sleiman Franjieh’s Marada party, and Wiam Wahhab and Omar Karami’s followers.

At the very base of this serious charge is the fact that no political organization in Lebanon is allowed, according to UN Security Council Resolution 1559, to form a military wing.

Nonetheless, any serious action taken to prevent the continuing illegal proliferation of arms should be made carefully, particularly in light of the recent clashes in Ain al-Hilweh in Sidon between Jund al-Sham and Fatah. Furthermore, last summer’s Nahr al-Bared conflict is still fresh in Lebanon’s mind – especially for the residents of Tripoli and North.

The situation is extremely delicate, but it must be resolved in no uncertain terms. Hezbollah security squares in the Dahiyeh are troubling enough – they must not be allowed to proliferate further. As the government strives to gain control over all Lebanese territory, no concessions should be made – and at very least, no additional authority lost.