For a small country, Qatar has certainly accumulated a diverse array of political positions. The oil-rich Gulf state is generally thought of as a close ally of the West: It is home to America’s most important military outpost in the Gulf region, a $1.5 billion airbase which played a major role in the latest Iraq war.  Furthermore, Qatar maintains close relations with Saudi Arabia, its American-friendly neighbor.  It even has low-level trade relations with Israel.

However, there is another side to Qatar. Unlike other Gulf states, Qatar has kept on good terms with both Iraq and Iran.  It maintains defense links with Egypt and Syria, as well.

On May 30th, the emirate took another stance that seemed out of sync with its strong Western ties: Qatar, the only Arab country currently represented on the UN Security Council, abstained during the vote on Resolution 1757 to establish an international tribunal to try those implicated in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
 
In his  remarks to the United Nations , Qatar’s UN ambassador Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser explained that while Qatar was “committed to helping Lebanon seek the truth, [and] hold accountable all those involved in those crimes,” the emirate had chosen to abstain out of fear that the vote “may not promote national détente and could further complicate the situation in a country that is at present in dire need of national cohesion.” In other words, Qatar is determined to help the Lebanese bring Rafik Hariri’s killers to justice – just so long as it is can be done without alienating Qatari allies.

According to Daily Star opinion editor Michael Young, this is part of a “familiar pattern you have with the Qataris” in refusing to be completely aligned with one faction.  “Qatar is always trying to play the role of independent actor.”
Before Qatar discovered that it was floating on a sea of oil, it was one of the poorest countries in the world.  Now, it is one of the richest.  As a tiny state, only slightly larger than Lebanon, Qatar does not dream of being a major regional power.  Instead, it is primarily interested in sustaining its booming economy.  To do so, it needs to keep the oil flowing, and maintain the broadest possible range of trade partners. The country’s foreign policy can best be understood as a form of benevolent realpolitik – essentially, the Qataris use their oil wealth to buy the goodwill of their neighbors.  Any concern over the political alignment or long-term goals of other states is secondary.

Qatar’s investment in Syria provides a good example. Qatar has embarked on programs to promote tourism and open Islamic banks in Syria. In 2005, Qatar and Syria founded the “Syrian-Qatari Investment Company,” a development company with declared capital of $5 billion.  “Qatar comes in and invests when Saudi doesn’t … there’s sort of a competition over where to put your petrodollars,” says Andrew Tabler, a fellow at the Institute of Current World Affairs and the editor-in-chief of Syria Today magazine. Tabler says that Syrian-Qatari relations are “not bad,” despite Qatar’s close connection with the United States.  “It’s kind of weird, actually,” he adds.

After last summer’s war, Lebanon was also a beneficiary of Qatari largesse.  The emirate gave a quarter of a billion dollars to rebuild the flattened town of Bint Jbeil, and Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani was the first Arab leader to visit Lebanon after the war.  The numerous “Thank You Qatar” billboards around Beirut and South Lebanon are a testament to the goodwill that Qatar inspired among the Lebanese.

But Qatari aid was inspired neither by simple generosity nor from a desire to win just Lebanese favor.  Qatar’s vocal support for Lebanon during the war deflected Arab criticism of Qatar’s trade relationship with Israel. The decision to rebuild Bint Jbeil, a primarily Shia village, served to assuage Shia groups in the Gulf, like those in Bahrain and northern Saudi Arabia, and bolstered relations between Qatar and Iran.  By maintaining stability and staying on good terms with its neighbors, Qatar keeps the oil money coming in.
 
The rise of Shia influence concerns many Arab countries, most of which are still led by Sunni governments.  “They are afraid these Shia groups could cause them to lose sway over their population, and lose the legitimacy to govern,” explains Tabler. Some Sunni governments resort to repression to limit the power of Shia forces. Qatar can afford to simply buy them off.

Qatar’s powerful neighbor Saudi Arabia presents a challenge for the state’s policy of neutrality. Qatar’s leaders “have to distinguish themselves from being completely identified with Saudi politics,” says An-Nahar’s opinion page editor Jihad al-Zein.  This means deviating from the Saudi line at times – though never so far as to risk a serious worsening of relations.
Qatar’s decision to abstain on UNSCR 1757 is an example of this desire to maintain Qatari ‘neutrality.’ “They hid behind the other abstentions,” asserts Young.  By not voting in favor the resolution, “they kept the line open to the Syrians and Hezbollah.”  Their vote means that they do not have to worry that their profitable trade relationship with Syria will be overturned, or that their Iranian neighbors will be angered.

On the other hand, the Qataris did not actually oppose the international tribunal, and their vote had no practical effect on the passage of 1757.  Because of this, it is unlikely that Qatar did any serious damage to its close relationship with the United States, Saudi Arabia, or even with Lebanon.  Indeed, on Thursday night, Saad Hariri thanked “even those who … abstained from voting in the Security Council.” Qatar appears to have once again succeeded at bridging the contentious terrain of Middle Eastern politics, remaining on good terms with all of the major players.

But of course, Qatar also did nothing to advance the cause of justice in Lebanon.  Instead, they merely gave the world one more indication of where there allegiances lie: wherever the money is.