Although Lebanon continues to feud over the next presidency, only one name is currently on the table: that of Army Commander General Michel Sleiman. But who really is this man who may very well spend the next six years in Baabda? Is he the Syrian ally rejected, until last week, by March 14 as the second coming of Emile Lahoud? Or is he the politically neutral defender of peace and security that people are speaking of now? And what does his record as a career soldier portend for the presidency? NOW Lebanon talks to army figures who have studied and worked with the general over the years about what the country could expect from a Sleiman presidency.

Michel Sleiman was born in Amchit, in the caza of Jbeil, on November 21, 1948. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1970 as a 2nd Lieutenant, and he also holds a Bachelor of Arts in political and administrative sciences from Lebanese University. He worked his way up through the ranks from infantry platoon leader to battalion commander in the early 1970s, returning to the Military Academy in 1976 to teach there and at the Non-Commissioned Officers’ School.
Sleiman’s career in the 1980s is much murkier, as is much of Lebanese history from this turbulent period. The Lebanese army’s official website makes no mention of what positions he held between teaching at the Military Academy in the late 1970s and the formalization of full Syrian control in 1990. However, military sources speaking to NOW Lebanon reported that he held “classical” positions such as battalion or company commander in the field. “He never worked in the headquarters at the Ministry of Defense while he was young,” reported one source.
From 1986 to 1990, Sleiman was the chief of staff for the 10th brigade in Baabda. His experience with the beginnings of postwar Syrian control were likely instructive. “When the Syrians occupied the Ministry of Defense in 1990, the 10th brigade was here, and they killed hundreds of soldiers of this brigade,” recounted the source. Sleiman quickly learned not to cross Lebanon’s new masters, and this caution served him well over the next decade.
Sleiman moved to Mount Lebanon as head of Military Intelligence in 1990, managing the army’s intelligence-gathering operations in that region in close cooperation with Syrian forces. He held this position for only nine months, and in August of 1991, he moved to the Ministry of Defense headquarters as secretary to the Army Command, the office administering all of the army’s operations nationwide. Sleiman was put in charge of the 11th Infantry Brigade in 1993, where he saw clashes with the Israelis, who were at the time still occupying a “security zone” in South Lebanon. Sleiman was promoted to General in 1996 and moved to the sixth Infantry Brigade. He was again promoted in 1998 to Lieutenant General and finally put in place as head of the army, the position he holds to this day.

The picture of Michel Sleiman painted by those who know him is one of a cautious and reserved career military man. One source recounted, “We were in the military academy together. He is a shy person. He is limited, he does not socialize, and he is a guy who stays at home. He was a normal, classical guy, and he is not corrupted.”
His record on corruption, however, is not completely spotless. Over the weekend, French daily Le Figaro reported on an episode in 2004, earlier flagged by Le Point on November 8, where Sleiman was caught with a French passport issued under false pretenses. The document listed his birthplace as Pontoise in Île-de-France, near Paris, rather than his native Amchit.
A source explained the incident to NOW Lebanon, “[Sleiman’s] secretary of office, Colonel Jezzini, now head of General Security, offered to get him a French nationality. He got one for him, his wife and his three children. The French confronted him, and he gave back the passport, but still, the court says he cannot go to France – both himself and Jezzini.”
The idea of a Lebanese president banned from travel to France is hard to fathom. However, many speculate that the French would likely lift the ban on Sleiman in the event of his election. The source defended Sleiman, insisting that “he did not do anything bad, it was Jezzini. But if I were to tell you I would get you a nationality, you would not just take it. You would ask why, and how, and so on.”
Sleiman’s rapid rise under Syrian occupation and the trust placed in him by the Syrians is the primary reason many within March 14 have been skeptical of the man. One military source summed it up. “Before 2005, Lebanon was under occupation by the Syrians... They nominated their collaborators, their agents. A free man would never be nominated. So he was nominated as being a collaborator like the other people. And he worked for them from 1998 to 2005 – seven years.”
Under Lahoud and Sleiman, the army took a very hard line against demonstrations and gatherings expressing opposition to Syrian control, and civil liberties eroded significantly. The crackdown reached its height in August of 2001, with the arrests of hundreds of anti-Syrian activists and brutal assaults on protesters. Subsequent years were more quiet, due mostly to the opposition’s increased caution in the face of the heavy-handed tactics of the army and ISF.
Yet during the protests that followed the February 14, 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Sleiman did not unleash the army to protect his ostensible masters. Since 2005, Sleiman has refrained from deploying the army against either side of the standoff between the anti-Syrian majority and pro-Syrian opposition. Over the past few weeks, he has rejected calls by Lahoud to ignore commands from the Siniora government and urged his forces to confront only those who turned their weapons against other Lebanese. The staunchly pro-Syrian Sleiman had seemingly been replaced by a nationalist.
Another source who studied with him at the Military Academy and served under him in 1994, explained, “Usually, he correctly reads the situation, and he plans correctly around the powers that be. He's very smart and knows how to reach his objectives. Usually he's a 'yes' man to the people in command. For that reason, the Syrians chose him to be chief of command.”
Sleiman is not one to rock the boat or radically change course, in contrast to General Michel Aoun, according to the source. Another source said, “He is not courageous; he will go and try to be in the middle.”
Sleiman’s political realignment, thus, was not reflective of a change of heart but merely a prudent reading of a new political situation in the country. “When the occupation left Lebanon, he tried hard to be in the middle. He tried to keep the army in the middle, and not divided. He is not courageous. He will never face Hezbollah or the Syrians or the Palestinians or Israelis or anybody. He will stay in the middle, in between,” the source added.
A second source concurred, adding, “Now he's the best man to deal with the situation we are in. You can predict how he will react, because he plays by the rules of the game.”
Sleiman could thus be a true consensus candidate, someone both March 14 and the opposition could reasonably expect to be neither overly antagonistic to them nor closely allied to their opponents. One thing he would not be, however, is a strong president capable of taking the lead on resolving the difficult political questions of the coming months and years, such as Hezbollah’s weapons, a new electoral law, and the implementation of international resolutions.
Warned one source, “Don't overestimate; this is a way of ‘maintaining’ the crisis, living with the crisis. We won’t solve anything.”
