On February 25, 2010, a photo was released showing Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at an official dinner in Damascus. 

Almost five months later, during which the sanctions on Iran have intensified, another picture was released, this time on July 19. It showed Assad speaking with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu following meetings in Damascus.

The two photos were loaded with messages. The first one stirred a number of concerns in Beirut and world capitals, implying as it did a solid alliance among these three leaders in the face of international pressure.

The second one seems to have caused concern among Hezbollah leadership, and the two recent speeches by Nasrallah were obviously more tense and aggressive than the ones he delivered after the formation of the national unity government in 2009. Everything since then seemed to Nasrallah to be under control and running smoothly. So what has changed?

In his last speech, Nasrallah attacked the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the alleged upcoming indictment of Hezbollah members and what he considered the unreasonable attitude of March 14 politicians. The thrust of his speech was built around a meeting in May during which Hariri allegedly told Nasrallah that the tribunal would indict Hezbollah members. “We reject the idea that Hezbollah members might be indicted,” Nasrallah concluded.

“Hezbollah is not afraid of anything. Those who conspire against the Resistance and against Lebanon are the ones who should worry,” Nasrallah added. He also stated he would not address the issue of a cabinet change before the STL issues its indictment, adding, “We will see what happens after the [STL] indictment [is issued].”

The issue of the STL indictment is obviously one of concern for Hezbollah, and by calling the STL “an Israeli tool,” Nasrallah has taken the level of confrontation to the point of no return. The STL has not yet set a date for the indictment. All we have are assumptions based on hearsay coming from local and international media. In light of such uncertainty - Nasrallah’s reaction, which has preceded any official statement, must be seen as that of a man feeling the heat.

It also comes hot on the heels of a number of incidents: the campaign against the security agreements between Lebanon and the US and France, the Israeli espionage scandal and the attacks against UNIFIL troops in the South. Analysts have interpreted these campaigns as targeting the international community and the West, with a special emphasis on both the STL and the sanctions against Iran.

Hezbollah has reason to be worried that the STL would actually accuse its members. Hence the reason why Nasrallah is trying to secure a statement - before it is too late - from the Lebanese government, especially Hariri, that Lebanon will not accept an indictment against Hezbollah. But so far this has not happened.

The second issue that seems to be infuriating the leader of Hezbollah is the “improved Syrian-Lebanese relations,” as highlighted in Damascus this past week. Assad’s welcoming attitude and the warm tone of his statements following the meetings, indicate a desire to enhance relations with Hariri and Lebanon. Of course, concrete changes are still unimplemented, such as border demarcation and closure on the fate of Lebanese detainees alleged to be in Syrian prisons, and only time will tell whether the Syrian regime is genuine about “equal relations.”

But these signs are enough for Nasrallah to smell the danger. With Iran facing sanctions, Hezbollah’s position is not secure. Add to that the possible STL indictment, the Israeli threats of another war and a Syrian rapprochement with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, not to mention the official state of Lebanon; Nasrallah might be on the back foot.

The photo released by Damascus last weekend does not mean that Syria will distance itself from Iran, but Assad wants to protect himself. He is not a man of ideology, so his support for Iran, although still solid, will not stop him from making different ties and bonds with other forces in the region as a form of insurance. 

So what’s next for Nasrallah? One school of thought says that Hezbollah will probably increase local tensions on all fronts and all levels until the Lebanese government rejects the tribunal, meaning more fiery Nasrallah speeches, controversial statements from its politicians and allies, media reports, direct or indirect threats, and even, in extremis, the threat of, or actual, armed intervention (A second “May 7” is already being spoken of in pro-Hezbollah media such as Al-Akhbar newspaper).

The other school says these fiery speeches and campaigns are signs that Hezbollah’s options are limited and Nasrallah is making these speeches to hide his party’s shortcomings. It says that another May 7 events is impossible because Syria will not back Hezbollah this time, because of the recent agreement between Assad and Hariri and a similar, broader understanding between Riyadh and Damascus.

While no one is talking of an official breakthrough between Hariri and Assad, there are signs of divergence between Syria’s and Iran’s allies in Lebanon. Compared with Nasrallah’s aggressive tone, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has been relatively quiet. On the media level, Al-Akhbar, which is close to Hezbollah, has adopted a tone similar to that of Nasrallah, while As-Safir, which is closer to Berri, has not.

Nasrallah might be threatened. He might feel the Syrian cold shoulder and the heat of the STL and may lash out to his ultimate detriment. But exploiting this is risky. Syria is not in the clear and the Lebanese need to protect themselves by abiding by the international resolutions and the core principles of sovereignty and freedom, instead of opportunist alliances that might only prove short-term solutions.

Hanin Ghaddar is managing editor of NOW Lebanon