US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Jeffrey Feltman, formerly his country’s ambassador to Lebanon, often tells the following story: “On March 13, 2005, I cabled Washington saying that given the political situation, demanding a Syrian redeployment into the Bekaa Valley seems to be the choice. Little did I know that more than 1 million Lebanese would take to the streets on March 14 demanding full Syrian withdrawal. The Lebanese were apparently a step ahead of politicians, who then followed.”

Sometime later, a Saudi-Syrian agreement was reached to form a Syrian-Lebanese “Security Committee.” Such a committee, a defiant Walid Jumblatt said at the time, would mean the return of Syrian dominance over Lebanon, and the March 14 leadership killed the suggestion.

For March 14 supporters, those were the days when their leaders, empowered by a sweeping popular mandate, could – and did – practice sovereignty, enjoying their hard-won freedom. America, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran had no choice but to accept Lebanon’s strong independence movement.

Then it collapsed. Some say the turning point came with Hezbollah’s “invasion” of West Beirut in May 2008, while others argue it happened because of a wind-shift in US policy, including the replacement of the savvy Feltman. A third group believes Qatar snatched Paris from March 14 and made out of it a pro-Syrian capital, while a fourth group says the “Lebanese file” in Saudi Arabia was moved from the hands of one group of officials to another, one more sympathetic to Syria.

None of these theories considers what happened inside Lebanon and within March 14. Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun sold out on Lebanese independence, thus weakening the coalition, while the remaining March 14 leaders went into hiding fearing for their lives.

Even before May 2008, some March 14 leaders had lost the stomach for the fight. In late 2007, Feltman addressed a Washington think tank, arguing that his country had thrown its weight behind the election of a Lebanese president with a simple majority. March 14 did not move, arguing this might invite violence from Hezbollah. It came anyway.

One defection after another and one concession after another resulted in a March 14 meltdown.

What remained of March 14, however, was its leaders’ fascination with world affairs. Americans are opening up to Syria, some argued – wrongly as it turned out. Others decided never to go the extra mile without Saudi approval, while a volte face by France was also blamed on the dip in March 14’s fortunes. 

In reality, March 14’s leaders never considered it was their failure to act when action was needed, whether through deposing former President Lahoud, appointing Shia ministers after Hezbollah and Amal walked out of the cabinet, electing a president with simple majority or behaving like winners after the June elections. For some reason, the March 14 leaders went from heroes to spectators obsessed with regional politics. Accordingly, Lebanon’s independence, sovereignty and freedom were compromised.

Since then, Lebanon has become a country in March 14’s image: A failure.

It elected Michel Sleiman, an unknown politician, to the presidency. Keen to live up to his description as a consensus leader, Sleiman has proven ineffective in his first 18 months and before that stood by as Hezbollah burned down Future TV and Al-Mustaqbal newspaper.

What is worse, the Sleiman lethargy syndrome has spread through various state institutions. The first to contract the virus were pro-March 14 diplomats, who cannot match their March 8 counterparts when it comes to spreading the political gospel.

In Washington, where Syrian, Libyan and Qatari diplomats and lobbyists show formidable effectiveness, the Lebanese Ambassador, Antoine Chedid, can be found at social functions, but never addressing think tanks or lobbying this senator or that congressperson.

Now, in the name of Lebanese consensus, Sleiman and Chedid are endorsing Hezbollah and Syrian talking points, such as the “right of resistance,” whether or not it achieves any Lebanese consensus, the “benefits of the US opening up to Syria” and more arms for the Lebanese Armed Forces, “though not to implement 1559 or 1701 or any other relevant Security Council resolution,” to name a few.

Lebanese consensus politicians, and now some March 14 leaders, are asking, “What can America do for Lebanon?” The same question is sure to be posed by Sleiman to US President Barak Obama when the two meet in the White House on Monday. Surely Obama should ask Sleiman, “What can you or the once pro-independence leaders do for Lebanon?”

America, like on March 14, 2005, will certainly follow.