Let’s first introduce you to our readers, can you tell us something about yourself?

Schenker: Well I’m the director of the Arab Politics program at the Washington Institute, and there I focus on the Arab countries in the Levant; Lebanon, Syria and Egypt primarily. But I have a lot more experience in Syria and Lebanon. From 2002 until 2006, I was the advisor to Secretary of Defense [Donald] Rumsfeld on what we called the Levant, [and] country senior advisor on Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories.

I think Jordan is very easy, there’s a lot of consensus in the US government that they are a great ally, that while imperfect in terms of government, they still have instinct toward reform and are viewed broadly as a peace partner toward Israel.

They do have problems, but unlike any other Arab state, really they have nationalized their Palestinians, they have citizenship, they vote, they belong to society, they feel like they belong to the society…

And of course [Jordan] has the Al-Qaida problem too.

As for Syria, there was a difference of views in the United States’ government, and Syria is both arsonist and fireman. They light fires and they say they can put them out, but this is the typical story with Syria – they have terrible relations with all their neighbors, with the exception of Turkey... They destabilize all their neighbors. Since 2003, the government policy in Syria, in coordination with Iran, was to de-stabilize Iraq from becoming a powerful democratic state… In Damascus you can see across the street from the US embassy dozens, hundreds of military-aged males lining up to sign up and get up on a bus right there to go to Baghdad and kill Americans in the run up to the war…
 
In Lebanon of course, never mind the violation of [UN Security Council Resolution] 1701, [Syrian has continued bolstering] the weapons of Hezbollah un-abated.

There’s strong suspicion that they have a significant role in the assassination of your former premier [Rafik Hariri], which really was a breaking point in the relationship. And of course, their support for Hamas, their de-stabilizing not only Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq actively, and then, of course Jordan as well.

The whole Shaker Abssi incident. According to Shark al-Awsat, he was sentenced to death in absentia in Jordan, but [Syria] provided sanctuary and exported him to Lebanon.

So this is the active policy of de-stabilizing the region.

Do you think that has changed now?

Schenker:  This is the question right now. With the Bush administration, they were essentially irredeemable; there [seemed to be] nothing we can do to improve their behavior. They sent five, six senior delegations to Damascus to meet with President Bashar al-Assad. The Syrians didn’t like the tone… Now you have a situation where you have a new administration, so the Syrians are feeling more economic pressure, certainly… The sanctions are having some level of effect.

But the Syrians more than anything, in my view, don’t like to be regionally isolated. Now there’s an inherent contradiction here. They have a 30-year relationship with Iran that has been invaluable to them. Likewise they have this perception of them being at the center of the region; the most important state in the region. Economically they are weak, politically they are weak. Certainly I think ethically and in terms of governance, they are weak.

Nobody denies they have influence. They have influence in Iraq because they send jihadis to Iraq. They have influence because they support Hamas; they have influence in Lebanon because they support Hezbollah.

Nevertheless, with the Obama administration coming in, the Syrian regime was looking forward to what they thought would be a very easy rehabilitation. They had been told by their envoys in Washington that it would be easy. And they were dramatically disappointed by the appointment of Jeffery Feltman as the assistant secretary [of State for Near Eastern Affairs], and the administration has taken a slow and measured policy toward Syria, which I think is going to renew everything; we’re not going to let this loss they have to change their behavior. And in response the administration will change its own behavior.

So I think actually the Obama administration took the first step, which was by allowing the sale of parts of [airliner] 747 to Syria… The United States was not selling parts for the reason that these planes were being used to fly military material to either to North Korea or Hezbollah... Then they sent Feltman to talks, but the Syrians were still talking about how they didn’t like Feltman.

Obviously Feltman was the tough driving force of US policy in support of Mach 14. They really resent him for that, so they’d been hoping to get [US Special Envoy George] Mitchell, who they think will be even more pliable and undercut Feldman’s authority. So the Syrians leaked that Mitchell had applied for a visa before the [Lebanese] elections. They had planned to send him after, to talk about the peace process, so we’ll see what Syria will do with Mitchell…

One thing is that the Syrians always say that they have a large degree of influence with Hamas. So the United States is saying, “Okay, show us.”

They want to know the price first, right?

Schenker: Okay so what is the price? Syria can often seem very appealing. They say all the time they want peace with Israel. Such statements come two weeks before a report from the [Special] Tribunal for Lebanon. They are timed very carefully to deflect pressure. But this time they came out and said they agree to help out the United States on border security with Iraq. This goes back to the fireman/arsonist [dichotomy].

Now they say they want cooperation, and there are some positive signs, even though less than a month ago Hillary Clinton and Dave Petraeus said that some of the most recent suicide bombers had crossed in from Syria.

The second thing that Syria has done that is in line with their rhetorically-positive approach is they’ve pledged to start working to cooperate with the [Special] Tribunal for Hariri. This is obviously viewed as a very positive development.

But it is just a statement.

Schenker: But the United States is looking to see whether this is just a statement or whether they are actually going to cooperate. Let’s see if the tribunal requests Asef Shawkat go to The Hague. The Syrians have said previously, many times that nobody is going…

I’m a critic of Syria, but I also think you have to give them credit where credit is due. Maybe they couldn’t influence elections in Lebanon, but they didn’t either. I mean, this is a country that is involved in the assassination, most likely, of several political figures over a long period of time. They shouldn’t be applauded over not killing people in Lebanon, but at the same time there’s some positive outlook on how they behaved in the elections. 

If Syria cooperates with the Special Tribunal, and with the West on Hamas and in Iraq, and the only price they want is Lebanon, what will the US do?

Schenker: Well no, both administrations have said – and I think you can imagine with somebody like Feltman – that this is not a price. But there’s a bigger question: Is the United States willing to allow Syria a greater hand in Lebanon if it splits from Iran?

The Lebanese know the Syrians very well; they know that Syrian influence in Lebanon strengthens its regional role. The Lebanese always have doubts when the US makes such statements. So what are the guarantees?

Schenker: There are no guarantees… It’s a difficult question. The administration says Lebanon’s not on the table.

Why is Lebanon that important to the US?

Schenker: Lebanon in 2005 became the only democratically elected pro-West country in the Arab world. This is a remarkable development, and then they did it again. And mind you, it’s an imperfect relationship because the United States does not like it when Fouad Siniora comes out with a letter of congratulations to Ahmedinejad, they don’t like it when the March 14 leaders say they are going to be the last country in the world to have peace with Israel. It’s imperfect, but nonetheless, it’s a democracy.
 
If the United States does not stand by it, it would really erode US credibility for a democratic project in the world. Right now, the administration did something very interesting, which was to leak the information about sending its ambassador back to Damascus.

Why do you think it happened now?

Schenker:  I think it puts a lot more pressure on Iran, that their leading ally is improving its relations with Washington, and maybe Damascus will find it so tempting. I don’t think it’s indicative of anything necessarily; it may be a bit more of an imaginative perception, but it’s a message. Syria has wanted a [US] ambassador for five years. I don’t think I would send this ambassador, certainly not before Lebanon gets its government. I’d keep this out there and wait and see how the border security goes in September and October.

We have to see how Syria is following through on its commitments, and the US has to do something - it’s not a reward, it’s a confidence-building measure.

Do you think Syria is capable actually of taking the initiative without the consent of Iran? Are they trapped, or do they still have a margin of freedom?

Schenker: This is an open question. For some time it’s been known that many in Syria are concerned with increasing Iranian influence over policy; many people view this as an issue of sovereignty and are resentful of it. Syria traditionally has played all sides, and maybe this is what is happening here; maybe they are looking for more freedom, more leverage, more maneuverability, while at the same time maintaining the relationship with Iran. Certainly if you look at Syria’s allies, Iran is having a lot of problems, Hezbollah did fine in the elections, but their allies were demolished. Hezbollah, because they are affiliated with Aoun, they are somewhat weakened in the political system.

There is also this issue of Wilayat al-Faqih, which has been the foundation of what Hezbollah calls their belief system, and has been shaken in Iran today, and perhaps irreparably damaged. To have millions of people come out and question Allah’s emissary on earth, is a remarkable development. So Hezbollah too is under a lot of pressure. You put all these together, and I think, if I’m Iran, I’m a little worried about my Syrian ally.

The pictures of this woman that the government murdered, it’s on You Tube and leaves an indelible image. I can’t imagine that the Shia in Lebanon are looking at this and taking pride in the Iranian government.

And the Iranian government is the spiritual home, the mother ship, for Hezbollah. This does not reflect well on Hezbollah.

So I think, this is what’s going on with Syria. Maybe they’re actually looking for improved relations with Washington, particularly in a world with Obama where not everybody in the Middle East is going to be suspect of US intentions. You know, this puts a great deal of pressure onto Syria beyond the pressures they already had.

What about Lebanon? If everything goes fine and there is no obstructing-third vote and March 14 is able to govern, would the US keep its promise to support the Lebanese government?

Schenker: Absolutely. There is a huge sigh of relief in Washington. All the media in Washington had covered the election. Everyone predicted the worst, and the US would have re-evaluated its level of support of Lebanon. What the US has done in terms of support is political support. The United States has learned the lessons of 1958 and 1982, 1983. We’re not putting boots on the ground in Lebanon, but they have provided political support for March 14. They have made big commitments in Paris to help rally the world to support this threatened government. And they have provided nearly half a billion dollars to Lebanese institutions. I think this is how the United States supports the Lebanese government, through Lebanese institutions that over time hopefully will play more of a national role in enhancing the sovereignty of the country. Clearly, we are a far way away from that, but someday, if you can serve this institution, it can serve the role that it was intended.

Militarily, are we still going to get more support from the US, despite all the Israeli criticism?

Schenker: If there is a question about Lebanon receiving advanced anti-aircraft weapons, the answer is probably no, but you can ask yourself the question here about credible deterrents. There are people in Lebanon that say they need weapons to prevent, deter Israeli attack. But if Lebanon gets a billion dollars a year instead of 500 million over four years, will the deterrents be as much as Syria has? Will they have as much anti-aircraft weapons as Syria? Israel has no hesitancy to go bomb a Hezbollah training center outside of Damascus or to blow up Syria’s nuclear facility, despite the anti-aircraft on the border. Lebanon will not have more than Syria. If Israel sees a security imperative, they will not hesitate to come. So I don’t think strategic parity is the productive way to view the problem.

But will they at least support the army, in case Nahr al-Bared is repeated?

Schenker: The United States sent 40 C-17s to Lebanon. Within a week Lebanon had burned through 30 to 50% of all its ammunition, and the United States stepped up and got something done that is incredibly difficult bureaucratically… They would do this again no doubt. Likewise, I think as with Jordan, if the Lebanese government is stable and pursues good policies, the United States will be willing to provide Lebanon with different levels of equipment. I don’t think there’s a doubt about that; there will be more confidence in this and in the institutions of the state.

On May 7, 2008, the army coordinated with Hezbollah in the invasion. They left areas, Hezbollah took them over and turned them back over to the army. What happened in 2006? The Lebanese Armed Forces had been a non-combatant force in the war, because the war was not really between Lebanon and Israel; it was between Hezbollah and Israel, and this was a wise policy. And yet Hezbollah plugged in to the radar and fired a land-to-sea missile and almost sunk one of Israel’s top three warships. Now you’re entitled to defend yourself. Hezbollah will do whatever it wants to do.

Yes, the army reflects the demographic of Lebanon. At the same time, though, it doesn’t exactly provide confidence that the army is a loyal institution that answers to the government, that there’s civilian control of the military. I’m not asking nor is anyone in the United States asking that the military disarm Hezbollah. It’s a domestic issue for Lebanon. People understand the limitations, and no one wants a return to civil war. This is maybe inevitable anyway if the Der Spiegel story turns out to be correct... But the United States has no interest in provoking this type of conflict or any other type of conflict.

But at the same time, they want to encourage this institution to develop in a way that is consistent with democracy, where it will protect the institutions of the state.

How does the US administration see Hezbollah within the Shia community? Especially since one of March 14’s mistakes is that they never looked for a Shia partner.

Schenker: The moderate through the independent Shia were never cultivated; they were ignored, and part of this [is] because March 14 didn’t want to antagonize their electoral allies...

There are Shia in Lebanon who are not supportive of Hezbollah, and they have to be cultivated and allowed to be independent so that they can be credible. They also have to find funding somewhere. It’s not as if Hezbollah does not get funding from Iran, but somehow it’s ironic that if Shia take money from Hariri they become non-credible.

This is a problem and a challenge that March 14 is going to have to confront. There are credible independent Shia out there, but, you know, it’s a dangerous business. Look what happened to Bassem Saba. Okay he’s not an independent Shia, but he is a Shia that is not aligned with Hezbollah. His house has been attacked now. The guy had to live in Qoreitem, because there was a significant threat on his life.

There is a Shia political party with weapons that threatens to kill or intimidate its political or military adversaries, so you’re going to have to find brave people and figure out a way to help them help themselves; it’s a tough corundum.

How would you help them?

Schenker: Well, you have to find alternative sources of funding.

They need to be credible to their community, and if you take money from the US directly, you will lose your credibility. So what do you do?

Schenker: Well there are NGOs, European NGOs, but this is not enough. Elections are expensive. How much does it cost to get name recognition when you are competing against somebody who not only has a lot of money and their own television channel, but weapons too.

So you not only need money, you need brave people. And there is no doubt that people will be killed. It’s tragic, but I think if March 14 want to be a truly national party, a coalition that is a coalition that represents all of Lebanon, and not just two-thirds, they are going to have to make an effort to cultivate the independent Shia. 

So about Iran, do you think that the demonstrations will continue? What is the best way for the reformists to go about getting what they want, and do you think their actions will work?

Schenker: What I would say is that this regime has demonstrated and continues to demonstrate that it will do whatever is necessary to stay in power. They will kill their people, they will violate human rights, and they will abandon even the visage they had of a democratic state.

If the oil sector went on strike, then it could be very destabilizing for the clerical regime. There is no doubt it would be a very interesting and important development for Iran and for the future of Iran.

What if nothing happens? What if the demonstrations stopped and Ahmadinejad stays in power for the next four years?

Schenker: Whatever happens, the regime and the institution of Wilayat al-Faqih [has been] weakened, and this is a good thing for the people of Iran, and it’s a good thing for the region, and particularly for Lebanon.